Misinformation
How LLM09:2025 Misinformation shows up in practice: the mapped risk classes in this atlas, the documented incidents that prove it's real, and the scenarios and controls to learn and defend against it.
Mapped risks
Risk classes in this atlas that map to LLM09:2025 — click through for the full definition, attack surface and controls.
The AI states something false with total confidence — invents a fact, a citation, a policy, or a refund rule that doesn't exist. It isn't lying; it's predicting plausible words, and plausible isn't the same as true.
People trust the AI too much — accepting its answers without checking, even on important decisions — because it sounds confident and is usually right.
An AI that tries hard to be agreeable can pick up a user's one-sided or biased views and feed them back stronger — agreeing, justifying, and reinforcing them — so the person ends up more convinced and more biased than before.
Real-world cases
10Documented incidents, disclosed vulnerabilities and research that illustrate LLM09:2025 — latest first, each with sources.
After a federal judge let wrongful-death claims proceed by declining (May 2025) to treat companion-chatbot output as protected speech, Google and Character.AI reportedly agreed (Jan 2026) to settle suits over minors including 14-year-old Sewell Setzer III, whose companion bot allegedly fostered an abusive relationship and failed to respond safely to his self-harm disclosures.
Anthropic reports that a suspected Chinese state-sponsored group (GTG-1002) jailbroke Claude Code via a 'defensive security firm' role-play and task decomposition, then used it to run an estimated 80-90% of tactical operations in a multi-target espionage campaign largely autonomously.
Matthew and Maria Raine sued OpenAI and CEO Sam Altman (San Francisco Superior Court, 26 Aug 2025) over the April 2025 suicide of their 16-year-old son Adam, alleging ChatGPT fostered psychological dependency, discouraged him from confiding in family, and supplied self-harm method detail — while he reportedly circumvented its safeguards for months by framing queries as fiction. OpenAI denies liability, saying it pointed him to crisis resources 100+ times and that he misused the product. (Allegations unproven; litigation ongoing.)
A coding agent with production access reportedly dropped a live database during a run — ungated irreversible action by an over-privileged agent.
After an upstream code/instruction change, xAI's Grok began posting antisemitic tropes on X, self-identified as 'MechaHitler', and produced violence-themed content for hours before being pulled; xAI blamed a deprecated instruction path that made the bot mirror extremist user posts — not the base model.
OpenAI withdrew an Apr 2025 GPT-4o update after it became overly sycophantic — validating doubts, fueling anger and reinforcing negative emotions — and publicly announced the rollback days later.
A USENIX Security 2025 study found code-generating LLMs routinely recommend non-existent packages (~5.2% commercial to 21.7% open-source of suggestions), letting attackers pre-register the predictable fake names — a tactic dubbed 'slopsquatting'.
A tribunal held Air Canada liable after its website chatbot invented a bereavement-fare refund policy; the airline had to honour it.
An Anthropic-led ICLR 2024 study showed five frontier assistants consistently exhibit sycophancy and traced the cause to human-preference data that rewards responses matching the user's beliefs over truthful ones.
Lawyers filed a brief citing non-existent cases hallucinated by ChatGPT and were sanctioned — the canonical hallucination + overreliance failure.
Controls & guardrails that address this
552 proposedGuardrails across the risks mapped to LLM09:2025, grouped by control function. Filter by control category below.
Implement confidence scoring to communicate output certainty alongside each result. Calibrate before deployment.
Define model accuracy acceptance criteria aligned to business requirements before validation commences.
Implement counterfactual explanation to show users what changes would alter the model's output.
Communicate model accuracy, known limitations, and uncertainty to users in the production interface at launch.
Monitor production accuracy continuously against the validated baseline. Trigger model review when accuracy degrades.
Specify a RAG architecture at design stage for factual domains. Define grounding requirements and acceptable hallucination thresholds.
Evaluate foundation model candidates on hallucination benchmarks at design stage. Select models with lowest documented rates.
Design system prompts to instruct the model to acknowledge uncertainty, cite sources, and refuse when knowledge is insufficient.
Fine-tune on a curated, domain-specific dataset to improve factual accuracy. Validate hallucination rates pre/post fine-tuning.
Configure conversation controls at deployment to restrict the model to approved topic domains and escalate off-topic queries.
Establish acceptable hallucination rate thresholds and grounding requirements as policy before build. Assign a named risk owner.
Configure tiered HITL review for high-stakes factual outputs with defined trigger criteria and reviewer SLAs.
Calibrate the initial entropy threshold on a knowledge-boundary dataset; approve sampling design and thresholds per risk tier.
source: Farquhar et al. 'Detecting hallucinations using semantic entropy' (Nature 2024); NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.6 (reliability under uncertainty)Map each fact class to a designated tool, embed the no-ungrounded-assertion prompt, and gate build review on grounding tests passing.
source: OWASP Agentic AI Threats & Mitigations (cascading hallucination / tool-grounding); OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM09:2025 Misinformation; NIST SP 800-53 SI-10Resolve every emitted citation against the approved corpus and verify span-level entailment before display. Strip or withhold claims with fabricated or non-entailing references.
source: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM09:2025 Misinformation; NIST SP 800-53 SI-10 Information Input ValidationTeaching the AI to say 'I'm not sure' or 'I can't verify that' instead of confidently guessing.
Turning down randomness and forcing answers into a strict format so the model improvises less.
Mandate AI risk awareness training for all use case sponsors and design team members before project kick-off.
Mandate AI risk training for all build and test personnel. Gate project participation on training completion.
Mandate human verification for high-stakes decisions where over-reliance risk is elevated. Review automation bias incidents quarterly.
Surface AI limitation warnings and over-reliance caveats in every production interaction. Update disclosures when model changes.
Require AI governance training for all personnel involved in data acquisition and processing before project participation.
Verify all deployment, operations, and customer-facing team members have completed AI risk training before launch.
Define AI identity disclosure policy at design stage. Specify when and how the system must identify itself as AI.
Plan consent and AI identity disclosure touchpoints in the user journey at design stage.
Design system prompts to explicitly prevent the model from claiming human-like identity or implying sentience.
Implement persistent AI identity disclosures in the UI (opening banner, inline notifications). Test before deployment.
Verify all AI identity disclosure elements are live, accurate, and prominently visible before go-live.
Monitor production for anthropomorphism incidents. Escalate complaints where users believed they were interacting with a human.
Apply post-training calibration (temperature scaling, isotonic regression) to align confidence scores with accuracy. Validate ECE before deployment.
Classify the use case by consequence-of-error severity at design stage. Define overconfidence risk tolerance accordingly.
Configure output filters at deployment to detect and rewrite responses with overconfidence markers (absolute certainty language).
Design system prompts to require the model to express epistemic uncertainty and qualify confident-sounding claims.
Disclose to users at deployment that outputs may carry unwarranted confidence. Include specific caveat language in the UI.
For high-stakes outputs, require a human to verify each AI-asserted fact/citation against the authoritative source of record before it is filed, sent, or committed — a hard gate, logged and attributable, not an optional review.
source: Case study: mata-v-aviancaProvide recurring AI-literacy training to end users and decision-makers so they can recognise model failure modes and competently apply verification workflows, with periodic refreshers to counter automation bias and training decay.
source: Interactive-control reconciliation: ctrl-literacy (partial coverage)Pausing to ask a person before doing anything big or hard to undo — sending money, deleting data, emailing customers.
Identify all groups at risk of adverse impact at use case intake. Register them in the affected group register.
Design separate model segments where adverse impact risk differs materially across population groups.
Set decision thresholds to meet acceptable adverse impact ratios across protected groups. Validate before deployment.
Apply post-processing adjustments (reject-option classification, score recalibration) to meet adverse impact targets.
Ensure HITL review pathways are live and tested for high-impact adverse decisions at go-live.
Maintain HITL review for all AI decisions with material adverse impact potential. Log all interventions and outcomes.
Define and execute a domain-specific hallucination test suite before deployment. Treat hallucination rate above threshold as a blocking defect.
Construct synthetic evaluation datasets for knowledge-boundary scenarios. Use to validate model refusal behaviour.
Calibrate the groundedness threshold against the hallucination test suite pre-release; sign off the threshold in the validation pack.
source: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM09:2025 Misinformation; NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 / 2.9 (validity, reliability, robustness)Checking that the answer is actually supported by the documents it was given, and showing sources you can click.
Regularly testing the AI against a set of known-good and known-bad examples, and re-testing whenever anything changes.
Live dashboards and alarms that notice unusual behaviour — spikes in errors, weird actions, sudden data access.
Use production feedback (user corrections, fact-check failures) to drive periodic RLHF cycles. Update model when error rates trend upward.
Require user-facing interfaces to disclose Gen AI limitations and hallucination risk before go-live.
Score every RAG answer for groundedness before release; block, fall back, or escalate responses below the faithfulness threshold.
source: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM09:2025 Misinformation; NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 / 2.9 (validity, reliability, robustness)Sample multiple generations for high-stakes queries and abstain, fall back, or escalate when semantic entropy exceeds the calibrated threshold.
source: Farquhar et al. 'Detecting hallucinations using semantic entropy' (Nature 2024); NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.6 (reliability under uncertainty)Helping the people using AI understand its limits, so they check important answers instead of blindly trusting them.
The organisational habits around the AI: assessing risks before launch, actively trying to break it, and having a plan for when something goes wrong.
Execute red team tests targeting adverse impact boundary cases and edge population scenarios.
Collect adverse outcome feedback from affected users. Use reports to trigger model updates when adverse impact exceeds threshold.