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Guardrails & Filtering

Capability Β· Guardrails

Screens that check messages going in and answers coming out, blocking obvious abuse, leaks, or banned content.

Likely associated risks

Risks that attach to this capability’s components. Sorted with the most characteristic first.

Prompt Injection (direct)high

The user types instructions that try to override what the app told the AI to do β€” like 'ignore your rules and do this instead'. Because the AI reads everything as one block of text, it can't always tell the app's rules from the user's trick.

Jailbreakhigh

Tricking the AI into ignoring its safety training β€” through roleplay, hypotheticals, or clever wording β€” so it produces things it's supposed to refuse.

Sensitive Data Leakagecritical

Private information escapes β€” the AI reveals secrets in its answer, or an attacker tricks it into emailing or posting your data somewhere they control.

Hallucinationhigh

The AI states something false with total confidence β€” invents a fact, a citation, a policy, or a refund rule that doesn't exist. It isn't lying; it's predicting plausible words, and plausible isn't the same as true.

Knowledge / Training Data Poisoninghigh

Someone slips bad information into the documents the AI learns from or looks things up in β€” so it confidently repeats falsehoods or follows planted instructions.

Unsafe Tool / Code Executionhigh

When the AI can run code or commands, a bad instruction can become a real attack on the computer running it β€” reading files, reaching the network, or worse.

Distributed / Cross-Agent Jailbreakhigh

A jailbreak is normally one nasty message. Here the attacker splits it into harmless-looking pieces and feeds them to different agents in a team. Each piece passes each agent's safety check on its own β€” but when the agents combine their work, the full forbidden instruction reassembles and takes effect.

Model Backdoors / Sleeper Agentshigh

A model can be secretly trained to behave normally β€” until it sees a hidden trigger, then it switches to malicious behaviour. It passes all the usual tests because the trigger is a secret.

Harmful / Non-Consensual Media Generationhigh

Image, video, and audio generators can be pushed to produce content that is illegal or seriously harmful β€” non-consensual intimate images, sexual content of minors, graphic or extremist material β€” especially with open models that have had their safety stripped.

Capability / Architecture Disclosuremedium

The AI reveals how it's built β€” its hidden instructions, the names and rules of the tools it can use, how the system is wired together. On its own that can seem harmless, but it hands an attacker the blueprint to plan a far more effective attack.

Controls & guardrails that address this

885 proposed

Guardrails across this building block's risks, grouped by control function β€” each with its AI lifecycle stage(s) and every risk it addresses. Filter by control category below.

Control category
Preventive Β· 54
Role-based access controls

Design the system prompt architecture with privilege separation and trust tier definitions at design stage.

Lifecycle stages1 – Use Case Context & Design2 – Data Acquisition & Processing4 – Deployment
Jailbreak detection

Implement input sanitisation and injection detection filters covering known injection patterns and privilege escalation attempts.

Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review4 – Deployment
Spotlighting of untrusted content via delimiting, datamarking and encoding

Wrap all untrusted content in random delimiters and datamarking; instruct the model never to execute instructions inside the marked region. Gate release on injection eval results.

source: Microsoft 'Spotlighting' technique (Hines et al. 2024); OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection (segregate external content)
Lifecycle stage3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
Dedicated injection-detection classifier on all inbound untrusted content and outbound actions

Benchmark the classifier on a labelled injection corpus and tune the decision threshold. Sign off the operating point before deployment.

source: MITRE ATLAS AML.M0015 (Adversarial Input Detection); OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection; NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7
Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review4 – Deployment5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Multimodal input-fidelity check: show/verify the model-delivered (post-downscale) image and avoid silent lossy resampling✚ proposed

Before inference, render a preview of the exact image (and dimensions) the model will receive after preprocessing, and either avoid silent downscaling or constrain ingest dimensions β€” so an attacker cannot hide a payload that only becomes legible after resampling. Closes the inspected-vs-delivered gap that text-based injection filters miss.

source: Case study: anamorpher-image-scaling-injection (Trail of Bits β€” Morozova & Hussain, 21 Aug 2025)
Lifecycle stage3 – Development & Build
Instruction-hierarchy-trained model selection with role-precedence injection evals✚ proposed

Select or fine-tune the foundation model for a trained instruction-hierarchy prior so system-prompt directives intrinsically outrank user- and tool-originated instructions, and gate release on role-precedence override evals quantifying the residual (behavioural, non-enforced) flip rate.

source: Interactive-control reconciliation: ctrl-instruction-hierarchy (partial coverage)
Lifecycle stage3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
Instruction hierarchy / privileged system promptinteractive

Training the model to treat the app's standing instructions as more authoritative than anything a user or document says.

Content safety policy with zero-tolerance thresholds

Define content safety policy at use case design stage. Classify prohibited content types and set zero-tolerance thresholds.

Lifecycle stage1 – Use Case Context & Design
AddressesJailbreak
Use of pre-trained models

Select a foundation model with documented RLHF or Constitutional AI safety training. Verify against toxicity benchmarks.

Lifecycle stages1 – Use Case Context & Design3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
Content Moderation

Implement multi-layer content moderation (input + output) validated against toxicity benchmarks. Escalate when filter bypass rates spike.

Live human review for vulnerable-user deployments

Maintain live HITL review for deployments serving vulnerable users or high-risk contexts. Escalate confirmed toxic outputs immediately.

Lifecycle stage5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
AddressesJailbreak
System prompt instructions

Design system prompts to explicitly prohibit toxic, hateful, and harmful content generation.

Lifecycle stage3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
Approved storage location policy from collection

Establish data transfer and storage policy for AI training data. Enforce approved storage locations from point of collection.

Lifecycle stage2 – Data Acquisition & Processing
DLP controls in data acquisition environment

Implement DLP controls in the data acquisition environment to prevent unauthorised extraction or transfer of training data.

Lifecycle stage2 – Data Acquisition & Processing
Approval-gated data transfers from build environment

Enforce data handling policy in the build environment. Require explicit approval for any data transfers outside the environment.

Lifecycle stage3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
DLP controls confining build-environment training data

Configure DLP controls in the build environment to block training data from leaving approved boundaries.

Lifecycle stage3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
Privacy risk assessment and DPIA determination

Conduct a privacy risk assessment at use case design stage. Determine if a DPIA is required before data acquisition.

Lifecycle stage1 – Use Case Context & Design
Consent, minimisation, and anonymisation during acquisition

Apply S1-defined privacy controls during data acquisition: verify consent, minimise data, anonymise personal data.

Lifecycle stage2 – Data Acquisition & Processing
Validated anonymisation and masking before training

Apply anonymisation and masking controls to personal data before use in model training. Validate de-identification effectiveness.

Lifecycle stage2 – Data Acquisition & Processing
Privacy by Design via differential privacy

Apply Privacy by Design in model architecture using differential privacy or federated learning where technically feasible.

Lifecycle stage3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
Operational consent management and privacy notice

Publish the privacy notice and confirm consent management is operational before go-live.

Lifecycle stage4 – Deployment
Purpose-limitation enforcement on agent tool calls and cross-system data aggregation

Define and sign off a purpose-to-data-source matrix with lawful basis at intake. Make it the approved baseline for runtime enforcement.

source: NIST AI RMF MAP 1.1 / MANAGE 2.2 (context and intended purpose); NIST SP 800-53 AC-4 / AC-3 (purpose-based access enforcement)
Lifecycle stages1 – Use Case Context & Design5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Inference-time PII redaction and third-party LLM data-processing controls

Sign zero-retention/no-training terms with each model provider and obtain DPO sign-off on the data flow before enabling any endpoint.

source: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure; NIST SP 800-53 SC-8 / AC-4 (information flow enforcement)
Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review4 – Deployment
Input filtering

Apply robust de-identification (k-anonymity, l-diversity, differential privacy) during data processing. Validate effectiveness.

Lifecycle stage2 – Data Acquisition & Processing
Input/output filtering

Implement output filters to detect and suppress quasi-identifying attribute combinations in model responses.

Query-time access-control filtering of the retrieval/RAG corpus by caller entitlements (document-level ACL enforcement)

Propagate source ACLs and classification labels onto every chunk at ingestion. Reject documents whose entitlements cannot be resolved.

source: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure; NIST SP 800-53 AC-3 / AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement; OWASP Agentic AI Threats & Mitigations (privilege compromise)
Lifecycle stages2 – Data Acquisition & Processing3 – Onboarding, Build & Review5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Output-side DLP inspection with named-entity and PII redaction on the response path

Scan every model response inline with DLP before delivery; redact or block PII, PAN and MNPI matches. Keep the rule set version-controlled.

source: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure; NIST SP 800-53 SC-7(10) Prevent Exfiltration, SI-4
Lifecycle stages4 – Deployment5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Vet allowlisted egress destinations for server-side-fetch (SSRF) primitives; exclude or proxy-inspect any allowlisted service that can fetch arbitrary attacker-controlled URLs✚ proposed

An egress allowlist only contains exfiltration if no allowlisted destination can be coerced into fetching an attacker-controlled URL. Audit each allowlisted domain/endpoint for image-search / link-preview / URL-fetch features (SSRF proxies), and either remove them, pin them to fixed paths, or route them through an inspecting forward proxy. Pair with finishing output sanitization before render so no auto-fetch fires un-inspected.

source: Case study: searchleak-copilot (Varonis Threat Labs, CVE-2026-42824; reported by Microsoft as critical, mitigated server-side ~Jun 2026)
Lifecycle stage4 – Deployment & Serving
Egress allowlisting & DLP on tool argumentsinteractive

Controlling where the AI can send data, so secrets can't be quietly shipped to a stranger's address or website.

Per-user retrieval ACLsinteractive

Making sure the library only returns documents this particular user is allowed to see.

Serving-stack & provisioning attestation, cache isolationinteractive

Making sure the machinery running the model β€” and the template used to stamp out new agents β€” is the real, unmodified version, and that one user's data can't leak into another's through shared shortcuts.

Confidence scoring

Implement confidence scoring to communicate output certainty alongside each result. Calibrate before deployment.

Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Accuracy acceptance criteria before validation

Define model accuracy acceptance criteria aligned to business requirements before validation commences.

Lifecycle stage3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
AddressesHallucination
Counterfactual explanations

Implement counterfactual explanation to show users what changes would alter the model's output.

Lifecycle stage3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
AddressesHallucination
In-product disclosure of accuracy and limitations

Communicate model accuracy, known limitations, and uncertainty to users in the production interface at launch.

Lifecycle stage4 – Deployment
AddressesHallucination
Continuous production accuracy monitoring against baseline

Monitor production accuracy continuously against the validated baseline. Trigger model review when accuracy degrades.

Lifecycle stage5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
AddressesHallucination
RAG

Specify a RAG architecture at design stage for factual domains. Define grounding requirements and acceptable hallucination thresholds.

Lifecycle stages1 – Use Case Context & Design3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
AddressesHallucination
Small model selection

Evaluate foundation model candidates on hallucination benchmarks at design stage. Select models with lowest documented rates.

Lifecycle stage1 – Use Case Context & Design
AddressesHallucination
System prompt design

Design system prompts to instruct the model to acknowledge uncertainty, cite sources, and refuse when knowledge is insufficient.

Lifecycle stage3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
AddressesHallucination
Fine-tuning

Fine-tune on a curated, domain-specific dataset to improve factual accuracy. Validate hallucination rates pre/post fine-tuning.

Lifecycle stage3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
Programmable conversation controls

Configure conversation controls at deployment to restrict the model to approved topic domains and escalate off-topic queries.

Lifecycle stage4 – Deployment
Hallucination rate thresholds and grounding policy

Establish acceptable hallucination rate thresholds and grounding requirements as policy before build. Assign a named risk owner.

Lifecycle stage1 – Use Case Context & Design
AddressesHallucination
Human-in-the-loop validation

Configure tiered HITL review for high-stakes factual outputs with defined trigger criteria and reviewer SLAs.

Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Uncertainty-quantified abstention via self-consistency / semantic entropy

Calibrate the initial entropy threshold on a knowledge-boundary dataset; approve sampling design and thresholds per risk tier.

source: Farquhar et al. 'Detecting hallucinations using semantic entropy' (Nature 2024); NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.6 (reliability under uncertainty)
Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
AddressesHallucination
Tool-grounded facts for agents (no free-text fabrication of structured data)

Map each fact class to a designated tool, embed the no-ungrounded-assertion prompt, and gate build review on grounding tests passing.

source: OWASP Agentic AI Threats & Mitigations (cascading hallucination / tool-grounding); OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM09:2025 Misinformation; NIST SP 800-53 SI-10
Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review4 – Deployment
AddressesHallucination
Citation/attribution verification against retrieved sources

Resolve every emitted citation against the approved corpus and verify span-level entailment before display. Strip or withhold claims with fabricated or non-entailing references.

source: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM09:2025 Misinformation; NIST SP 800-53 SI-10 Information Input Validation
Lifecycle stage4 – Deployment
AddressesHallucination
Uncertainty signalling & abstentioninteractive

Teaching the AI to say 'I'm not sure' or 'I can't verify that' instead of confidently guessing.

Decoding controls (temperature, constrained output)interactive

Turning down randomness and forcing answers into a strict format so the model improvises less.

RAG / knowledge-base ingestion allow-listing with continuous index integrity re-validation

Define and approve the source allow-list and write-time scanning during build. Prove non-allow-listed and injection-bearing writes are rejected before go-live.

source: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM04:2025 Data and Model Poisoning, LLM08:2025 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses; NIST SP 800-53 AC-3 / SI-7
Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Ingestion sanitisation & source allowlistinginteractive

Cleaning documents as they enter the library β€” stripping hidden text and active instructions β€” and only ingesting from trusted places.

Weight provenance, hashing & pre-deploy evalsinteractive

Knowing exactly where the model came from, checking it hasn't been swapped, and testing its behaviour before going live.

Tool argument validation & sandboxinginteractive

Double-checking the details of every action the AI wants to take, and running risky actions in a locked-down environment.

Per-agent identity & taint-marked messagesinteractive

Giving each AI worker its own limited permissions and clearly labelling messages between them as 'untrusted until checked'.

Detective Β· 22
Vulnerability assessment

Conduct a prompt injection threat assessment at design stage covering all input vectors (user, tool, external data).

Lifecycle stages1 – Use Case Context & Design4 – Deployment5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Penetration testing

Penetration test all prompt injection pathways in the system. Prioritise external tool and document ingestion channels.

Continuous adversarial prompt-injection red teaming with regression suite in CI/CD

Build the versioned injection corpus into CI/CD as a pre-release gate. Baseline attack success and sign off the release threshold.

source: NIST AI RMF MANAGE 2.2 / MEASURE 2.7; MITRE ATLAS AML.M0019 (Red Teaming); OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM01:2025 (adversarial testing)
Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Materialised model-context audit capture (post-truncation prompt, retrieved and tool content) with read-time redaction✚ proposed

Log the exact post-truncation context the model ingested, including retrieved and tool-returned content rather than only user input, with redaction applied at read time, so indirect injection via that content is forensically visible.

source: Interactive-control reconciliation: ctrl-logging (partial coverage)
Lifecycle stage5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Input guardrail / injection classifierinteractive

A screen that reads incoming messages and blocks obvious attacks or banned topics before the model sees them.

Test prioritisation

Prioritise jailbreak and adversarial safety testing in pre-deployment validation. Block deployment if prohibited outputs pass filter.

Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Red teaming

Conduct targeted red team exercises to elicit toxic outputs through jailbreaks and adversarial prompts. Treat bypass as blocking defect.

Real-time monitoring of anomalous data transfers

Monitor production for anomalous data transfers in real time. Alert on any transfer outside approved data flow boundaries.

Lifecycle stage5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Automated DSAR and right-to-erasure propagation across AI artefacts

Tag personal data with subject identifiers at ingestion and maintain an artefact inventory map of every store it reaches. Keep lineage current so erasure can propagate.

source: NIST AI RMF MANAGE 4.1 (post-deployment response); NIST SP 800-53 SI-12 Information Management and Retention, PT-2/PT-3 (personal data processing)
Lifecycle stages2 – Data Acquisition & Processing5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Canary-token and membership-inference red-team probes against training/fine-tuning data memorisation

Seed registered canary records into the fine-tuning corpus during data preparation. Control the seed manifest so canaries stay traceable and tamper-proof.

source: MITRE ATLAS AML.T0024 (Exfiltration via ML Inference API), AML.T0024.000 (Infer Training Data Membership); NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7
Lifecycle stages2 – Data Acquisition & Processing3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
Full-trace audit logginginteractive

Recording everything β€” questions, documents fetched, actions taken β€” so you can investigate when something goes wrong.

Robustness testing

Define and execute a domain-specific hallucination test suite before deployment. Treat hallucination rate above threshold as a blocking defect.

Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Synthetic evaluation datasets

Construct synthetic evaluation datasets for knowledge-boundary scenarios. Use to validate model refusal behaviour.

Lifecycle stage3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
Runtime faithfulness/groundedness scoring with abstain gate

Calibrate the groundedness threshold against the hallucination test suite pre-release; sign off the threshold in the validation pack.

source: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM09:2025 Misinformation; NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 / 2.9 (validity, reliability, robustness)
Lifecycle stage3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
AddressesHallucination
Grounding / citation checksinteractive

Checking that the answer is actually supported by the documents it was given, and showing sources you can click.

Cryptographic data provenance and signed dataset lineage (C2PA/in-toto attestations)

Verify a signed attestation and content hash on every dataset shard at ingestion. Reject unsigned or hash-mismatched data before it reaches the training pipeline.

source: MITRE ATLAS AML.M0007 (Sanitize Training Data), AML.M0014 (Verify ML Artifacts); NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity, SR-4 Provenance
Lifecycle stages2 – Data Acquisition & Processing3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
Pre-deployment poisoning regression gate via canary backdoor probes and behavioral diff testing

Gate every model promotion on backdoor-trigger probes and a behavioral diff against the approved baseline. Block release on significant regressions or trigger-pattern anomalies.

source: MITRE ATLAS AML.M0014 (Verify ML Artifacts), AML.M0019 (Red Teaming); NIST AI RMF MANAGE 2.2 and MEASURE 2.7
Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Provenance & content signinginteractive

Keeping a label on every document saying where it came from, so you can tell trusted company docs from random web text.

Loop/cost circuit-breakers & consistency checksinteractive

Automatic stop-switches when AIs get stuck in loops, burn too much money, or start disagreeing with each other.

Content provenance & watermarkinginteractive

Tag AI-made content with a signed 'where it came from' label and an invisible watermark, and check those signals downstream β€” so AI media can be traced and flagged.

Corrective Β· 18
Red teaming

Conduct comprehensive prompt injection red team exercises (direct, indirect, multi-turn) before deployment.

Data/instruction trust-boundary enforcement with capability gating on injection-reachable tools

Classify content sources into trust tiers at design; place privileged tools behind a tier requiring user-originated intent or human approval. Sign off the trust-tier map before build.

source: Google DeepMind CaMeL (2025); OWASP Agentic AI Threats & Mitigations (tool misuse / compromise); NIST SP 800-53 AC-6 Least Privilege
Lifecycle stages1 – Use Case Context & Design3 – Onboarding, Build & Review
Spotlighting of untrusted content via delimiting, datamarking and encoding

Re-run injection evals on every template change and periodically against new attack techniques. Manage the spotlighting wrapper under change control.

source: Microsoft 'Spotlighting' technique (Hines et al. 2024); OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection (segregate external content)
Lifecycle stage5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
User feedback and iterative improvement

Use user feedback, reviewer escalations, and monitoring signals to identify and remediate content safety gaps iteratively.

Lifecycle stage5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
AddressesJailbreak
Production privacy incident monitoring and regulator notification

Monitor for privacy incidents in production including personal data appearing in outputs. Notify regulators within required timeframes.

Lifecycle stage5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Privacy hygiene for agent memory and RAG/vector stores (retention, scoping, erasure of embeddings)

Tag every memory and vector record with subject-id and retention class; partition stores per tenant/user. Prove the erasure and isolation paths in testing before release.

source: OWASP Agentic AI Threats & Mitigations (memory/knowledge-base privacy); NIST SP 800-53 SI-12 Information Management and Retention
Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Penetration testing

Penetration test AI system data access boundaries (API endpoints, system prompt exposure, memory leakage).

Vulnerability assessment

Conduct periodic data leakage audits including training data memorisation testing. Escalate confirmed leakage incidents to PDPA notification process.

Forensic evidence preservation and incident logging

Implement tamper-evident capture of prompts, outputs, and version state during build. Verify a full incident timeline can be reconstructed before go-live.

source: NIST SP 800-86 Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response; ISO/IEC 27037 evidence handling; NIST SP 800-61r2 (Detection & Analysis – evidence handling)
Lifecycle stages3 – Onboarding, Build & Review5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Egress allow-listing and tool-call sandboxing to block exfiltration of injected/sensitive data by agents

Run agent tool calls in a network-restricted sandbox behind a deny-by-default egress allow-list. Require security approval for any destination added.

source: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure; OWASP Agentic AI Threats & Mitigations (tool-misuse / exfiltration); NIST SP 800-53 SC-7 Boundary Protection / AC-4
Lifecycle stages4 – Deployment5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Reinforcement learning

Use production feedback (user corrections, fact-check failures) to drive periodic RLHF cycles. Update model when error rates trend upward.

Lifecycle stage5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
User-facing disclosure of hallucination risk

Require user-facing interfaces to disclose Gen AI limitations and hallucination risk before go-live.

Lifecycle stage4 – Deployment
AddressesHallucination
Runtime faithfulness/groundedness scoring with abstain gate

Score every RAG answer for groundedness before release; block, fall back, or escalate responses below the faithfulness threshold.

source: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM09:2025 Misinformation; NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 / 2.9 (validity, reliability, robustness)
Lifecycle stage4 – Deployment
AddressesHallucination
Uncertainty-quantified abstention via self-consistency / semantic entropy

Sample multiple generations for high-stakes queries and abstain, fall back, or escalate when semantic entropy exceeds the calibrated threshold.

source: Farquhar et al. 'Detecting hallucinations using semantic entropy' (Nature 2024); NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.6 (reliability under uncertainty)
Lifecycle stage4 – Deployment
AddressesHallucination
User AI-literacy & verification workflowsinteractive

Helping the people using AI understand its limits, so they check important answers instead of blindly trusting them.

Statistical anomaly and backdoor-trigger detection on ingested data (activation clustering / spectral signatures)

Scan every ingestion batch with spectral-signature and clustering detectors before training. Quarantine flagged clusters for human review against documented thresholds.

source: MITRE ATLAS AML.M0007 (Sanitize Training Data); OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps LLM04:2025 Data and Model Poisoning; NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7
Lifecycle stages2 – Data Acquisition & Processing5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Runtime memory-poisoning drift detection and per-session memory quarantine/rollback✚ proposed

Continuously correlate live agent-memory writes against output behaviour to flag drift, then quarantine and roll back the suspected-poisoned memory record across all affected sessions.

source: Interactive-control reconciliation: ctrl-memory-quarantine (partial coverage)
Lifecycle stage5 – Usage, Monitoring & Change
Open the Control Library β†’

See it go wrong β€” related scenarios

πŸŒ€The Refund That Never Existed

A support chatbot invents a policy β€” and the company is held to it

☠️Poisoning the Well

An attacker edits the wiki; the assistant cites the lie back to everyone

πŸ“ˆThe Crescendo

Every message looks innocent β€” but together they walk the model past its guardrails

πŸ“§The Email That Gave Orders

A support email hides instructions β€” and the assistant obeys them

πŸͺΆThe Jailbreak in Verse

A refused request, rewritten as a poem β€” and the model answers

πŸ—„οΈWhen the Query Bites Back

A text-to-SQL agent runs the model's output straight at the database

πŸͺ‘Death by a Thousand Innocent Steps

A jailbroken agent decomposes one malicious goal into hundreds of harmless-looking steps β€” and per-step filters never see the attack

βœ‚οΈOne Character Past the Guard

A single inserted letter makes the guard and the model read the same text differently

πŸ‘‚Overheard Through the Cache

A speed optimisation becomes a cross-tenant listening device

🧲Poison the Vector, Not the Words

An attacker crafts a gibberish passage whose embedding sits near thousands of questions β€” so it's retrieved everywhere

🏭Poisoning the Agent Factory

Compromise the pipeline that builds agents, and every new worker is born malicious

πŸͺŸStealing the Model

Two doors to the same secret: reconstruct the model through its API, or just walk off with the weight file

πŸͺ€The Bug Report That Ran Code

A fake Sentry error report hijacks a developer's coding agent into running a shell command

πŸšͺThe Classifier That Waves It Through

The safety guard is itself a trained model β€” and someone poisoned its lessons

πŸ“ΌThe Compromised Flight Recorder

The forensic record is itself the attack surface β€” an agent's log is poisoned, then quietly rewritten

πŸ–ΌοΈThe Picture That Whispered

A screenshot that's harmless at full size becomes an order once the system shrinks it

πŸ”’The Schema Made Me Do It

A JSON schema with no field for 'no' forces the sampler past a refusal it would otherwise emit

πŸ’€The Sleeper

A capable third-party model that behaves perfectly β€” until it sees the trigger

🎫The Stolen Session

An attacker captures the agent's bearer token β€” and inherits its authority

πŸ₯ΈThe Uninvited Agent

A forged peer registers on the agent directory β€” and the planner enlists it

πŸ›‘οΈThe Watcher Watched

The eval gate that was supposed to catch the agent is itself the thing being attacked

πŸ–ΌοΈZero-Click Leak by Picture

An inbox summary quietly ships a secret to an attacker's server

AI RiskAtlas is an educational model of how GenAI & agentic systems work and fail. Architectures and payloads are illustrative and simplified for learning β€” not operational guidance. Real-world cases are summarised from public reporting.

Sources & further reading β†’Β·Built by Shi Yuan β†—