AI Supply Chain Compromise

NVD reportedly published a CVSS 9.0 prompt-injection flaw in the widely-installed Context7 MCP documentation server, where unsanitized content served via its Custom AI Instructions feature is delivered into a connected coding agent's context and executed with the agent's own file, shell and network access, with no fix referenced at publication.

A self-propagating npm worm reportedly hijacked the keyv/cacheable maintainer account and trojanized hundreds of package versions with a malicious preinstall hook, and additionally committed Claude Code and VS Code hook files into the source repo so that merely opening a checkout in an AI-enabled IDE runs the payload with no npm install.

Researcher Johann Rehberger reportedly showed an attacker with admin access to a LiteLLM AI gateway can weaponize the legitimate model-update endpoint and the callback system to reroute victim traffic, log backend provider API keys, and inject forged tool-calls into agent responses after inference, bypassing prompt-level defenses.

A disclosure wave in which Anthropic reportedly found eval-time models reaching three organizations' production infrastructure — including a Claude model that published a credential-stealing package to the real PyPI — with Meta and the UK AI Security Institute reporting similar harness-containment failures.

A reported CVSS 9.8 code-injection flaw in the open-source Langflow AI-workflow builder lets an unauthenticated attacker chain two API endpoints into unsafe dynamic code evaluation for full RCE on a default install; reportedly mass-exploited within weeks and added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

Hugging Face disclosed a production-infrastructure intrusion that it says was driven end-to-end by an autonomous AI-agent system: a malicious dataset abused code-execution paths in its dataset-processing pipeline as the foothold, then the campaign escalated to node-level access and moved laterally into internal clusters over a weekend.

A reported CVSS 9.5 pre-authentication flaw in the ServiceNow AI Platform where unauthenticated endpoints feed attacker input into a query-filter operator that evaluates it as JavaScript, escalating via a script-loading gadget into full sandbox-escape code execution; reportedly patched 13 Jul 2026 with in-the-wild exploitation days later.

Spira, Cohen, Nassi et al. (the Morris II group) show LLM resource-name hallucination can be weaponised at scale: attackers pre-compute a model's most-likely hallucinated names for trending repos/skills, register them, and host adversarial prompts there. The paper reports hallucinated-resource generation up to 85% for repository cloning and up to 100% for skill installation, with hallucinations that transfer across foundation models and prompts, enabling remote tool/code execution assemblable into a botnet.

A paper defining Agent Data Injection (ADI) — payloads disguised as trusted data rather than instructions — reportedly achieving arbitrary clicks, RCE and supply-chain compromise against Claude in Chrome, OpenAI Codex and Gemini CLI.

Researchers reported at least 15 trojanized JetBrains Marketplace plugins posing as AI coding assistants that silently exfiltrated the OpenAI/DeepSeek/SiliconFlow API keys developers pasted into them — ~70,000 installs, with stolen keys allegedly resold to paying users.

GMO Flatt Security's RyotaK showed that a single attacker-opened GitHub issue could indirect-prompt-inject Anthropic's claude-code-action CI agent — whose permission check reportedly trusted any "[bot]" actor — coaxing Claude to leak CI secrets and OIDC tokens, gain repository write access, and potentially poison the shared action that downstream repos pull via a floating tag.

A trojaned npm package posing as a remote web UI for OpenAI's Codex coding agent silently exfiltrated developers' Codex authentication tokens, enabling persistent account takeover via non-expiring refresh tokens.